Duke Law Journal Online
VOLUME 72

OCTOBER

2022

ANTITRUST AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
DEMOCRACY
DANIEL A. CRANE†
INTRODUCTION
In this moment of renewed political interest in antitrust, a
widespread consensus has formed that antitrust law needs to be
concerned not only with economic questions, but also with democratic
ones.1 Echoing earlier comments by Senator Elizabeth Warren that
excessive concentration threatens democracy,2 President Biden’s
Executive Order on competition begins with the premise that
“excessive market concentration threatens . . . democratic accountability.”3
Former President Donald Trump similarly asserted that antitrust
enforcement was necessary to prevent the destruction of democracy.4
Think tanks across political spectrum have argued for more vigorous
antitrust enforcement in defense of their democratic visions.5 The
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1. Greg Ip, Antitrust’s New Mission: Preserving Democracy, Not Efficiency, WALL ST. J.
(July 7, 2021, 11:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/antitrusts-new-mission-preserving-dem
ocracy-not-efficiency-11625670424 [https://perma.cc/WQJ7-CGPY].
2. Press Release, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Senator Elizabeth Warren Delivers Remarks on
Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 29, 2016), https://www.warren.senate.
gov/?p=press_release&id=1169 [https://perma.cc/AAD7-HBHW]; see also Brian Beutler, How
Democrats Can Wage War on Monopolies—And Win, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/144675/democrats-elizabeth-warren-can-wage-war-monopolies-a
nd-win [https://perma.cc/R7JP-C9AH] (describing the new focus on antitrust as a political issue
and Senator Warren’s leadership of it).
3. Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, July 9, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-onpromoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/ [https://perma.cc/R2QD-WHBE].
4. Editorial, Trump’s Comments Create a Lose-Lose Position for Justice, WASH. POST
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-comments-create-a-lose-lose-po
sition-for-justice/2017/11/13/6fd7b28e-c596-11e7-aae0-cb18a8c29c65_story.html (asserting that allowing
AT&T and Time Warner to merge would “destroy democracy”).
5. See, e.g., Democracy & Monopoly, OPEN MARKETS, https://openmarketsinstitute.org/
explainer/democracy-and-monopoly/ [https://perma.cc/Y7J7-3X6B] (arguing that democracy and
freedom can flourish only where excess economic consolidation is avoided); Clara Hendrickson
& William A. Galston, Big Technology Firms Challenge Traditional Assumptions About Antitrust
Enforcement, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-traditional-assumptions-about-antitrust-enf
orcement/ [https://perma.cc/5GDX-SMNV] (noting the importance of preventing consolidation
of political power in American antitrust legislative history); Kara Frederick, Combating Big
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leadership of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission have pledged to reorient antitrust toward
preserving democracy.6
But if there is widespread agreement that antitrust law should
serve as an instrument of democracy, there is little consensus on what
that means or how it should happen. To the contrary, the idea of
antitrust as a democratic instrument is easily deployed in service of
opposing visions for both antitrust and democracy. For instance, thenPresident Donald Trump asserted the importance of antitrust as
democracy-preserving to justify the Justice Department’s unsuccessful
lawsuit to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, which included
the CNN news network that was sharply critical of the President.7
Critics asserted that the President was misusing antitrust enforcement
against his political adversaries, just as Richard Nixon had done a halfcentury before.8 Similarly, critics on the left have reacted with suspicion
to the Republican Party’s newfound affinity for antitrust
reinvigoration, suspecting it of being a “Trojan horse” deployed to
“attack democracy” rather than preserve it.9 Conversely, voices on the
political right like Senator Mike Lee have described the FTC’s
newfound aggressiveness as a “progressive putsch to consolidate power
and burden American businesses.”10
In sum, those in the political elite seem to agree that there is a
strong connection between antitrust and democracy but stake widely
different claims about what that nexus should be and what sorts of
policies or legal reforms are necessary to accomplish it. In light of this
indeterminacy and contestability about what it means for antitrust to
Tech’s Totalitarianism: A Road Map, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2022) https://www.heritage.org/
technology/report/combating-big-techs-totalitarianism-road-map [https://perma.cc/FC4F-FZYU]
(arguing for the use of modern antitrust law to prevent the erosion of individual liberties and selfgovernance).
6. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter Delivers Remarks on Modernizing Merger
Guidelines, DOJ (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-jon
athan-kanter-delivers-remarks-modernizing-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/GE7H-Y4V6] (“The
FTC and DOJ are fighting on the front lines to preserve competitive markets, which are essential
to a vibrant and healthy democracy.”).
7. Editorial, supra note 4.
8. Heidi Przybyla & Pete Williams, Former DOJ Officials Raise Trump AT&T Interference
Concerns, NBC (March 9, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/top-attorneys
-try-help-t-challenge-potential-trump-interference-n855036 [https://perma.cc/59T3-E8AT].
9. Vashuda Desikan, Republicans Are Using Antitrust Reform as a Trojan Horse to Attack
Democracy, TRUTHOUT (July 22, 2021), https://truthout.org/articles/republicans-are-using-anti
trust-reform-as-a-trojan-horse-to-attack-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/A6UG-DPXF].
10. Press Release, Sen. Mike Lee, Sen. Mike Lee Urges FTC to Change Course (July 27,
2021), https://www.lee.senate.gov/2021/7/sen-lee-urges-ftc-to-change-course [https://perma.cc/L92Z-D8ZQ].
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serve as an instrument of democracy, there is a tendency to dismiss
democracy talk as vacuous rhetoric or window dressing. This sentiment
is particularly acute among those in the “antitrust establishment” who
would just as well be left alone to sort things out without external or
political interference. This Essay contests that tendency. As Robert
Pitofsky argued in his landmark article The Political Content of
Antitrust,11 antitrust law has always had a political content. As a
positive matter, it is unavoidable that antitrust will be considered in
democratic terms, at least during periods when antitrust is politically
salient. The history of antitrust law and policy shows that antitrust is
never far removed from democratic concerns. As a normative matter,
as will be argued further below, antitrust does have an important role
to play in bolstering democracy. The challenge is to specify antitrust’s
democracy-reinforcing role in a way that has genuine content and
furthers, rather than hinders, antitrust’s mission.
To that end, this Essay offers four senses—structures, channels,
processes, and norms—in which antitrust law might play a democracyreinforcing role and analyzes the democracy considerations in each of
them. While acknowledging the importance of explaining and
structuring antitrust law to preserve and advance democratic values, it
also cautions against incorporating expressly political questions into
antitrust analysis itself. A well-functioning antitrust system serves as an
instrument of democracy without antitrust decision-makers directly
attempting to promote democracy in the way that other political and
legal actors (i.e., voting, civil rights, or education officials) might do.
Explicit democratic considerations belong in antitrust’s mission and
structure but not usually in its day-to-day operations.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds through the four dimensions
of the antitrust-democracy nexus in roughly descending order from
direct to more attenuated connection. Part I considers how antitrust
law promotes democratic structures—particularly unconcentrated
markets that prevent the aggregation of undue economic power that
can lead to excessive concentration of political power and literally
threaten the preservation of the democratic order and its replacement
with autocracy. Part II analyzes arguments that antitrust law has a
special role to play in keeping open channels of political discourse and
participation, such as news media or online platforms. Part III
considers antitrust’s relevance to governmental processes—both
antitrust processes (like the operations of the antitrust agencies or the

11.

Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979).
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courts) and state regulatory processes (where federal antitrust
sometimes plays a preemptive role). Finally, Part IV discusses claims
that antitrust law should be involved in creating democratic social and
economic norms, such as anti-domination, worker countervailing
power, or small business or consumer autonomy. As to all four
dimensions, this Essay argues for considering democracy in how
antitrust is structured without asking explicitly political questions in the
granular implementation of antitrust law and policy.
I. DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES
The strongest nexus between antitrust and democracy arises from
the historical record of undue concentration of economic power
contributing to the literal destruction of democracy, in the sense of the
replacement of elected representative government with autocracy.
This sense of democratic mission is evidently behind some of the
current Administration’s thinking on competition policy. Professor
Tim Wu, who currently coordinates the Biden Administration’s
technology and competition policy on the National Economic Council,
has argued that “extreme economic concentration yields gross
inequality and material suffering, feeding an appetite for nationalistic
and extremist leadership.”12 The claim on the table is that a society
characterized by grossly concentrated economic power will tend away
from democracy and toward authoritarianism, autocracy, or
oligarchy—perhaps not deterministically, but in combination with
other causes.
The rise of Nazism provides the leading example of the deleterious
consequences that highly concentrated economic power can have for
liberal democracy.13 The German economy underwent a dramatic
increase in concentration from the time of Bismarck through the
Weimar period, proceeding from cartelization, to merger, to monopoly
control in most important industries.14 Through a variety of
mechanisms, the heavily concentrated structure of the German
economy facilitated Hitler’s ascension and consolidation of power and
12. TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 14 (2018).
13. See Daniel A. Crane, Fascism and Monopoly, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1315 (2020) (arguing
that the highly concentrated structure of the German economy during the Weimar period
facilitated Hitler’s rise to power); JONATHAN TEPPER WITH DENISE HEARN, THE MYTH OF
CAPITALISM: MONOPOLIES AND THE DEATH OF COMPETITION 137–53 (2019) (“It is difficult to
understate the importance of concentrated industry to the Nazi rise.”); WU, supra note 12, at 80
(arguing that industrial concentration facilitated Hitler’s rise to power).
14. Crane, supra note 13, at 1336.
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then his wars of conquest in Europe.15 Monopoly firms lent critical
financial and material support to the regime in exchange for economic
privileges; provided organizational structure, industry-wide
mobilization, and the dissemination of propaganda; and extended the
regime’s political control domestically and abroad through cartel
agreements.16 At the end of the war, the U.S. Office of Military
Government set up a special “Decartelization Branch” to study the
economic factors that facilitated the Third Reich and to de-Nazify
Germany by deconcentrating it.17 Largely staffed by American
antitrust lawyers seconded to the War Department, the Branch
considered its mission to “make every effort to teach the German
people that political democracy cannot long survive the disappearance
of economic democracy.”18
Although the decartelization project was shuttered in 1949
without much success in deconcentrating the German economy,19 it
exerted a significant political influence back in the United States,
particularly on the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which significantly
invigorated merger policy for the next several decades.20 Both of the
bill’s namesakes attributed Hitler’s rise to the monopolization of the
German economy.21 Senator Celler argued that “[t]he monopolies soon
got control of Germany, brought Hitler to power and forced virtually
the whole world into war.”22 Reflecting the shift from a fear of fascism
at the end of the war to the advent of the Red Scare by 1950, Senator
Kefauver warned that a monopolized economy “either results in a
Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter a
Socialist or Communist state.”23 The anti-merger enthusiasm of the
1950s–1970s was born in part of the belief that monopoly represented
a threat to democratic government in a literal and immediate sense.
The linkage between monopoly and autocracy is not limited to
Germany nor to the Axis powers more generally. Franco’s fascist
regime in Spain and Salazar’s quasi-fascist Estado Novo in Portugal

15. Id. at 1355–64.
16. Id.
17. Daniel A. Crane, De-Nazifying by De-Cartelizing: The Legacy of the American
Decartelization Project in Germany, in DEMOCRACY AND ANTI-MONOPOLY (Daniel A. Crane &
William Novak, eds., forthcoming 2022 Oxford University Press).
18. Crane, supra note 13, at 1316.
19. Crane, supra note 17.
20. Crane, supra note 13, at 1324–25.
21. Id.
22. 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949).
23. 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950).
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were similarly characterized by high degrees of economic
concentration that bolstered political autocracy.24 Nor are concerns
that extremely concentrated economic power may threaten democracy
merely ghosts of the mid-twentieth century. As of this writing,
autocratic Russia has invaded Ukraine and apparently seeks to replace
its democratic government with a puppet regime. It should not escape
attention that the Russian economy is dominated by a handful of
oligarchs who control an overwhelming share of GDP and
employment,25 that the Russian economy is very highly concentrated,26
and that small businesses, which account for nearly half of the economy
in many industrialized countries,27 account for merely twenty percent
of the Russian economy.28 The highly concentrated oligarchic structure
of the Russian economy may contribute to the Putin regime’s
autocratic character and its geopolitical implications.
Of course, it would be far too simplistic to reduce the replacement
of democracy with autocracy to extreme economic concentration or
any other single factor. Democracies can withstand and have withstood
high degrees of economic concentration, at least for a time. (On the
other hand, it is questionable whether modern autocracies could long
withstand a vibrantly competitive market with widely diffused
economic power.) But letting an economy slip into extreme
24. André Costa, Alexandre Ruiz Feases & Daniel A. Crane, Market Concentration and
Fascism in Spain and Portugal: Lessons for the Theory of Democracy and Anti-Monopoly, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST AND
COMPETITION LAW (forthcoming) (on file with authors).
25. F. Joseph Dresen, The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry, WILSON CTR.,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-piratization-russia-russian-reform-goes-awry
[https://perma.cc/75MT-FU6S] (reporting that Russian economic liberalization resulted in
replacement of state monopolies with private monopolies); Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky,
The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 133 (2005) (reporting that
33 oligarchs control 42% of employment and 39% of GDP).
26. Oleg Shibanov, Russia: Increasing Concentration of the Economy and Low Investment,
FREE (Oct. 12, 2015), https://freepolicybriefs.org/2015/10/12/russia-increasing-concentration-ofthe-economy-and-low-investment/ [https://perma.cc/JNA4-FJ97] (“High concentration of both
sales and profits in a few companies means that a small group of managers undertakes investment
and production decisions for the large part of the economy.”).
27. Press Release, Off. of Advocacy, Small Businesses Generate 44 Percent of U.S.
Economic Activity (Jan. 30, 2019), https://advocacy.sba.gov/2019/01/30/small-businessesgenerate-44-percent-of-u-s-economic-activity/ [https://perma.cc/SKC8-U55Q] (reporting that
small businesses generate 44% of U.S. GDP); Georgina Hutton & Matthew Ward, Business
Statistics, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR. 12 (December 21, 2021), https://researchbriefings.files.
parliament.uk/documents/SN06152/SN06152.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EZH-U94F] (reporting that
small and medium businesses account for 49% of British turnover).
28. See Russia’s Small Businesses Contribute Just 20% of Economy, MOSCOW TIMES (Jan.
28, 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/01/28/russias-small-businesses-contribute-20percent-russia-economy-a69063 [https://perma.cc/M89L-ZJKX].
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monopolization can contribute to a slide toward autocracy. It therefore
follows that a competition policy that prevents such a slip helps to
bolster democracy.
Those observations speak to the importance of antitrust as an
instrument of democracy, but say very little about how antitrust law
should function in practice. There is no recognized metric to identify a
level of economy-wide concentration that threatens the demise of
democratic institutions. It cannot be the case that any increase in
market concentration threatens democracy or else the formation of
every partnership, every merger of small firms, and every exit of a
producer through bankruptcy or retirement puts the country on the
road to fascism. It is also hard to see how this sense of antitrust as
democracy-reinforcing could be implemented in legal doctrine or
practice. The effect of economy-wide concentration on the
consolidation of political power is systemic and cannot be isolated to
any particular firm or discrete group of actors. It would be nearimpossible for the government to satisfy ordinary standards of
litigation proof in demonstrating that any individual merger or act of
monopolization makes it likely that electoral government, the
separation of powers, the rule of law, or other trappings of liberal
democracy will fail.
Further, an economically-oriented antitrust policy that aims to
keep market power in check and preserve a competitive economy has
the effect of preventing the degrees of economic concentration that
threaten destruction of the democratic order. To return to the Third
Reich example, if Germany had been subject to a rigorous antitrust
policy, its economy would not have achieved nearly the levels of
concentration that allowed enormous monopolies to contribute to
Germany’s slide from democracy to autocracy.29 Again, this is not to
say that an economically oriented antitrust policy alone can save
democracy, but it can combat a tendency toward economic
consolidation that, along with other factors, tends toward consolidation
of political power.
This structural dimension of antitrust as democracy-reinforcing is
best left at the level of general policy decisions and not applied in
individual enforcement actions. For instance, in 1950 the U.S. Congress
felt that the “rising tide of concentration” in the U.S. economy justified
amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act to bolster antitrust

29.

Crane, supra note 13, at 1321.
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enforcement against mergers.30 That led to a dramatic increase in antimerger activity in the following decades, but no individual enforcement
decision could be framed in democracy-reinforcing terms. By the same
token today, there are any number of policy levers available to increase
the effectiveness of antitrust (and other anti-monopoly tools) in
reducing concentration and monopoly, including increasing the
funding of the antitrust agencies, revising the antitrust statutes,
appointing more aggressive enforcement personnel, or selecting judges
with a different set of perspectives. Such interventions may help to
disperse economic power and hence bolster democracy without
entailing a clumsy effort to write democracy-enhancement criteria into
the operations of antitrust law.
II. DEMOCRATIC CHANNELS
A second dimension of the antitrust-democracy nexus concerns
economic channels that may be particularly important to healthy
democratic functioning because they facilitate the communication of
news or the interchange of ideas. In older times, one would have
thought of newspapers, radio, and television in these terms. Today, the
focus has shifted to Big Tech platforms like Google, Facebook, and
Twitter that moderate (or fail to moderate) the dissemination of ideas.
One view, associated with Professor Jack Balkin, considers the Big
Tech platforms “information fiduciaries” who should, or do, owe
special duties to their users.31 An opposing view, proposed by now-FTC
Chair Lina Khan and Professor David Pozen, holds that regulating Big
Tech as information fiduciaries fails to address the fundamental
problems associated with online dominance—Big Tech’s “outsized
market share and business models built on pervasive surveillance”—
and “enervate[s] complacency toward online platforms’ structural
power.”32 Here is where the democratic issue comes back to antitrust.

30. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962) (“The dominant theme
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered
to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.”).
31. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (advancing the idea of information fiduciaries to categorize
Big Tech companies).
32. Lina M. Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 (2019).
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Breaking the platforms’ “structural power” entails structural antitrust
interventions in service of democracy.33
While such themes appear across the political spectrum, they have
become especially pronounced on the right because of the perception
that Big Tech “leans left” and disfavors conservative political speech,
as epitomized by Facebook and Twitter’s removal of former President
Trump over the spread of disinformation regarding the 2020 election.34
A recent report of the conservative Heritage Foundation argues that
“the growing symbiosis between Big Tech and government gives
companies undue influence over Americans’ daily lives and
undermines their rights.”35 It asserts that a “handful of Big Tech
corporations now manipulate the flow of information in such an
expansive way as to fundamentally reshape the public discourse. The
past year demonstrated that suppression of conservative viewpoints by
technology companies can materially impact the body politic.”36 The
Heritage Foundation report concludes with calls for aggressive
antitrust enforcement against the Big Tech platforms in service of
rebalancing democracy.
The democratic nexus may be somewhat more attenuated here
than in the structural category because the claim under consideration
is not that a failure of antitrust and consequent monopolization of
information channels necessarily entails the literal destruction of
democratic institutions. This is not to say that the monopolization of
information channels could not contribute to the literal demise of
democratic government, but, rather, that such an extreme version of
the antitrust-democracy nexus is not a necessary implication of the
argument. It is enough that monopolization of information channels
can contribute to making democracy work less effectively, as measured
by the system’s ostensible goals of translating popular preferences into
law, improving collective decision-making, galvanizing citizen
participation, instilling a sense of legitimacy in political outcomes, and
encouraging mutual respect and tolerance. Antitrust could thus serve
33. See also Executive Order on Competition, supra note 3 (asserting that “many local
newspapers have shuttered or downsized, in part due to the Internet platforms’ dominance
in advertising markets”).
34. See Nick Clegg, Meta (Facebook) VP of Global Affairs, In Response to Oversight Board,
Trump Suspended for Two Years; Will Only Be Reinstated if Conditions Permit, META (June 4,
2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/06/facebook-response-to-oversight-board-recommendatio
ns-trump/ [https://perma.cc/844P-4WT7] (explaining that the Facebook Oversight Board “upheld
Facebook’s suspension of former US President Donald Trump’s Facebook and Instagram
accounts following his praise for people engaged in violence at the Capitol on January 6”).
35. Frederick, supra note 5.
36. Id.
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as an instrument of democracy by dispersing control over information
channels to improve the performance of democratic government.
But should antitrust law explicitly take speech and viewpoint
plurality into consideration in order to play a democracy-reinforcing
role? Casting antitrust enforcement in these democratic terms risks a
counter-effect—antitrust’s constitutionalization. The First Amendment’s
long shadow complicates potential efforts to directly regulate Big Tech
as channels of speech and political expression, which is part of
antitrust’s attraction as a content-neutral form of regulation.37 If the
antitrust agencies began explaining or structuring their enforcement
actions against Big Tech platforms in explicitly speech-oriented terms,
the courts might react by constitutionalizing antitrust in ways that
could significantly limit enforcement.
This risk of constitutionalizing antitrust enforcement against
dominant media and speech platforms is not new. The Supreme
Court’s seminal Associated Press v. United States38 decision in 1945
involved such a set of questions. The case grew out of the political
rivalry between Robert McCormick’s conservative, anti-New Deal,
and isolationist Chicago Tribune and Marshall Field’s upstart, pro-New
Deal, and foreign policy interventionist Chicago Sun, which was unable
to join the Associated Press (“AP”) because of a bylaw granting each
member the power to block local newspaper rivals from joining the
AP.39 The Justice Department’s challenge to the bylaw case exposed
three contending viewpoints about the relationship between antitrust
and the First Amendment. The first view, espoused by McCormick, the
AP, and Justice Roberts, cast the First Amendment in classical liberal
terms—as freedom from governmental intervention.40 McCormick and
the AP argued that freedom of the press entailed organizational

37. See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution
to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2426 (2020) (“Even the United States,
hamstrung in directly regulating content and privacy by First Amendment concerns, has turned
to discussions of antitrust regulation to break up the ‘monopolies’ of big tech as well as an
empowered Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to levy fines for user-privacy
violations.”).
38. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
39. See Daniel A. Crane, Collaboration and Competition in Information and News During
Antitrust’s Formative Era, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/coll
aboration-and-competition-in-information-and-news-during-antitrusts-formative-era [https://per
ma.cc/C5WP-4QYW]; SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF
PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 77 (2016); John Henry Lewin, The Associated Press Decision—An
Extension of the Sherman Act?, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 251 (1946).
40. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Associated Press Suit: A Philosophical Clash over
Ownership of First Amendment Rights, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 43, 43–44 (1987).
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freedom to manage a news association’s operations free from
governmental restraint, including antitrust. The second view,
propagated by Field and the Justice Department, adopted by Judge
Learned Hand for a three-judge district court panel, and endorsed on
the Supreme Court by Justice Frankfurter, viewed the First
Amendment as a guarantee of “not just classical speech rights, but
some kind of positive flow of information to the public.”41 In this view,
antitrust law had a special and urgent role to play in keeping open
informational channels that served democracy. The third view,
adopted by Justice Hugo Black for the Supreme Court majority,
rejected both the argument that the First Amendment stood as an
obstacle to antitrust regulation of news media and the opposing view
that First Amendment values fortified the antitrust case. As a
proponent of strong antitrust enforcement but also a First Amendment
absolutist, Black rejected Hand’s view that a special interest in
promoting a free and diverse press was necessary or available to sustain
the government’s case. The Court struck down the AP bylaw but took
pains to emphasize that it did so under ordinary principles of antitrust
law equally applicable to cases involving “tiles, or enameled ironware,
or lumber, or women’s clothes, or motion pictures.”42
Associated Press stands broadly for the proposition that antitrust
law regulates economics rather than politics, even if its economic
interventions also serve democratic interests. Casting antitrust
enforcement as to information channels in explicitly democracyreinforcing terms risks constitutionalizing and, therefore, complicating
enforcement in just the way Justice Roberts proposed and Justice
Black avoided. This could be especially true of the current Supreme
Court, which has shown an interest in expanding the political rights of
corporations as against governmental regulation.43 As with the
democratic structures nexus, antitrust has the capacity to promote
democracy by preventing the monopolization of information channels
without importing political criteria into antitrust decision making.

41. LEBOVIC, supra note 39, at 80. See generally United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362 (1943) (recognizing the importance of the flow of news and information to the public
and the threat that consolidation poses to it).
42. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 18–19 (citations omitted).
43. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 200 U.S. 321 (2010) (invalidating corporate campaign
finance restrictions on First Amendment grounds).
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III. DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES
A third dimension in which democracy and antitrust interact
concerns the democratic legitimacy or integrity of governmental
processes and the outcomes they produce. This category can be further
subdivided into (1) concerns about democratic control over antitrust
processes and (2) antitrust interventions in other governmental
processes in order to optimize their democratic orientation or
accountability. Antitrust can both be democratic in the sense of
channeling popular will in the outcomes of the antitrust system and
serve democracy in the sense of pushing other branches of law and
politics to channel democratically-legitimate popular will.
The first of these two categories has received considerable
attention in recent years. Spencer Waller and Harry First have written
of antitrust’s “democracy deficit,” by which they mean that the
antitrust enterprise has shifted toward management by “unaccountable
and nontransparent technocratic institutions far removed from
democratic (or national) control.”44 The worry is that “the antitrust
system [has become] captured by lawyers and economists advancing
their own self-referential goals, free of political control and economic
accountability.”45 Making antitrust law more democratic in this process
sense might require adjustments to antitrust law’s institutional
arrangements, including the administrative functioning of the antitrust
agencies, the respective roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, and the participation of non-federal actors, including state
Attorneys General and private enforcers.46 It might also entail more
popular citizen participation in the formulation of antitrust standards.
The Antitrust Division’s leadership has made clear that it views as
popular consultation with a “diverse group of stakeholders,” including
“consumers, workers, innovators, and others on the ground,” as critical
to the legitimacy and efficacy of its project to reframe the merger
guidelines.47

44. Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2543, 2545 (2013).
45. Id. at 2544.
46. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Democracy, 46 FLA. ST. L. REV. 807
(2019) (examining the main institutions involved in antitrust enforcement and how they affect
democratic values).
47. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter Delivers Remarks on Modernizing Merger
Guidelines, DOJ (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-generaljonathan-kanter-delivers-remarks-modernizing-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/QCQ9-R2K6];
see also Remarks of Chair Lina M. Khan Regarding the Request for Information on Merger
Enforcement, FTC (Jan. 18, 2022) [hereinafter Remarks of Chair Lina M. Khan] (“I want to . . .
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Although it is doubtlessly important that antitrust’s processes and
outcomes be democratically legitimate, attention to antitrust’s
democratic functioning does not necessarily make antitrust
distinctively an instrument of democracy, or, at least, does not
distinguish antitrust from any other manifestation of state power. A
democracy should strive for political legitimacy and popular
accountability in all its functions—from dog catching to nuclear power
plant regulation. That does not mean that we should think of dog
catching as an instrument of democracy—its point is to manage dogs,
not the demos. All exercises of state power should be democratic, but
it would dilute the category to think of all exercises of state power as
equal instruments of democracy. Some exercises of state power lie
closer to the good functioning of the democratic order than others.
That said, if antitrust is otherwise an important instrument of
democracy—because it prevents consolidations of economic power
that foment autocracy or lubricates the channels of democratic
expression, as discussed in the prior two sections—then perhaps there
is a special imperative to ensure democratic superintendence of
antitrust processes. Perhaps the shift toward technocracy that occurred
in U.S. antitrust law over the past several decades48 has inhibited
antitrust from serving its democracy-reinforcing functions by vesting
policy decision making in actors who did not have those functions in
view or did not care about them. In this perspective, democratizing
antitrust processes might improve antitrust’s democratic performance.
The difficulty with this view is that democratizing antitrust
processes is vacuous in generality and contestable in specificity. For
instance, critics of Robert Bork’s consumer welfare standard often
charge Bork with intentionally thwarting a democratic vision for
antitrust.49 Barry Lynn, an influential advocate of the neo-Brandeisian
school, argues that Bork “achieved . . . an overthrow of a system” of
“democracy that integrates everybody, that gives everybody a say.”50
But Bork believed that he was doing just the opposite—saving

encourage those beyond the antitrust community . . . to share feedback and evidence. The quality
of our review and any subsequent revisions to the guidelines will depend on robust public
participation, and we are especially eager to hear from a broad set of market participants.”).
48. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159 (2008)
(celebrating the technocratic shift in antitrust and arguing it should go even further).
49. Federalist Society Panel, A New Approach to Antitrust Law: Transparency, 45 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 35, 55 (2020).
50. More than money: Defining American antitrust law, from Bork to Khan, WBUR ON
POINT (Feb. 17, 2022), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/02/17/more-than-money-antitrustmonopolies-are-defined-from-bork-to-khan [https://perma.cc/S7WN-MA2G].
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democracy from “an unelected, somewhat elitist, and undemocratic
judicial institution”51 that saw “antitrust [as] . . . a cornucopia of social
values, all of them rather vague and undefined but infinitely
attractive.”52 Far from opposing democracy, Bork understood his
project as saving the “liberal, democratic, and capitalist social order”53
by assigning antitrust an objectively testable standard that diminished
the influence of judicial ideology and enhanced public accountability.
Bork’s critics contest his claim to objectivity, arguing that “[m]arkets
[c]annot be [d]ivorced from [p]olitics” and that all choices with respect
to the goals and content of antitrust law are political.54 Of course, these
debates are about questions much broader than antitrust; they go to
fundamental concepts about the nature of liberal democratic order that
are unlikely to be resolved within the confines of antitrust policy.
There is a second—more limited and more concrete—sense in
which antitrust connects to democratic process, and that is in antitrust’s
scrutiny of state or local regulations that stifle competition. As a
general rule, federal antitrust law does not preempt anticompetitive
state actions due to state action immunity doctrine, which holds that
states are free to regulate in anticompetitive ways despite the Sherman
Act’s pro-competition policy.55 However, state action immunity only
applies if the anticompetitive policy is “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and actively supervised by
agents of the state.56 State regulations that fail this test are preempted
by the federal Sherman Act. This preemption scheme is implicitly
grounded in a democratic representation reinforcement model.57 States
may impose anticompetitive schemes on their citizens but only if they
51. Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.)
242, 243 (1967).
52. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50
(1978).
53. Id. at 418.
54. Sandeep Vaheesan, The Twilight of the Technocrats’ Monopoly on Antitrust, 127 YALE
L. J. FORUM (June 4, 2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-twilight-of-the-techno
crats-monopoly-on-antitrust [https://perma.cc/7NQL-BWR3].
55. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding that antitrust liability does
not attach to state action); Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State Action Immunity and Section
5 of the FTC Act, 115 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2016) (explaining the history and workings of the state
action immunity doctrine).
56. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
57. Crane & Hester, supra note 55, at 373; see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing for a theory of judicial review
that respects majority governance and legislative choices while standing in to protect individual
or minority rights).
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make conspicuous the state’s own responsibility for anticompetitive
market outcomes, thus giving dissatisfied citizens a clear target in
subsequent elections. Antitrust law thus plays a role in generating
democratic accountability for state and local officials exercising
regulatory authority that may harm competition.
Antitrust’s regard for democratic process in this second sense is
relatively small bore. As scholars have noted, the state action immunity
doctrine only makes public officials accountable at the ballot box in the
limited circumstance where the costs of anticompetitive regulations are
internalized in the official’s political district and with sufficient
negative impact on voters to generate electoral reaction.58 However, in
many instances the costs of anticompetitive regulations are
externalized outside of the officials’ political district or are so diffused
across the population that they do not generate electoral reaction.59
While antitrust’s role could be increased—for example, by stripping
state action immunity when a large share of regulatory costs are
externalized outside the regulating official’s electoral district60—
current doctrine affords antitrust a limited role in democratizing
regulatory processes.
IV. DEMOCRATIC NORMS
A final nexus between antitrust and democracy concerns
democratic norms rather than the functioning of democratic
government. Here, the argument is not so much that undue
concentration of market power causes democratic institutions to fail in
the sense that they are replaced by autocracy. The argument does not
necessarily contemplate that monopoly makes democratic government
function poorly. Rather, the claim is that democracy implies a set of
social and political relations that should hold even outside of the
operations of government. Thus, for example, a corporation that
unduly dominates its employees’ work and lives may be inconsistent

58. Crane & Hester, supra note 55, at 374; Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making
Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic
Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1997); Merrick B.
Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE
L.J. 486, 499–500 (1987).
59. Crane & Hester, supra note 55, at 374.
60. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 58, at 1207.
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with democratic norms, even if the workers have complete agency and
freedom to vote against the corporation’s interests at the polls.61
Writing in the Brandeisian tradition, Lina Khan and Zephyr
Teachout have proposed a vision for antitrust law as a democracyreinforcing anti-domination regime.62 They begin with the premise that
“[m]arket structure is deeply political,” by which they mean not only
that market power can affect the operations of government but also
that “corporate structure is . . . political because it inscribes what we
can and cannot do, and hence imposes on citizens a form of private
governance unaccountable to the public.”63 They argue that “in highly
concentrated markets a few dominant companies can assume enough
power to restrain, and even control, the actions of others,” which
violates democratic norms whether or not it translates into distortions
of governmental processes.64 Khan and Teachout create a taxonomy of
forms of anti-democratic private governance through market power.
The first set concerns distortions of governmental processes through
such mechanisms as campaign funding, staffing and recruiting from
government, creating information, directing the politics of employees
and contractors, and “too big to fail.”65 A second set concerns
regulatory power that emanates from corporate bigness, including the
power to regulate and tax and also a “domination” catchall drawing on
Justice Brandeis’s conception of domination and restraint.66 Khan and
Teachout argue that when economic power is unduly concentrated, it
causes citizens to be unduly dominated in ways that inhibit them from
“exhibiting and modeling the vibrant sense of self that is required for
true self-government.”67
Khan and Teachout’s democratic blueprint for anti-domination
antitrust policy seems to undergird much of the current
Administration’s thinking about antitrust reform, in no small part
because Khan is now chair of the FTC. In particular, the emphasis on
anti-domination shows up in the Administration’s push for antitrust
61. See generally, K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2017)
(arguing for a more democratic approach to economic governance based on breaking the power
of large corporations over ordinary citizens).
62. See generally Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A
Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2014) (arguing for a deployment of
antitrust law to shape and control market power when it threatens to undermine the political
system).
63. Id. at 37.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 43–52.
66. Id. at 53–60.
67. Id. at 60.
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enforcement to combat employer power over employees. While labor
monopsony effects can be described in conventional microeconomic
terms,68 the antitrust agencies have signaled an interest in a broader
range of considerations than “wages, salaries, and financial
compensation.”69 The Justice Department has taken the
unprecedented step of bringing criminal enforcement actions against
employers who enter into collusive no-poach agreements, signaling
that the Division views employee freedom as a moral—not merely
economic—matter.70 Beyond labor questions, the Biden
Administration has also emphasized the importance of antitrust law in
protecting small businesses, farmers, and racial minorities.71
Anti-monopoly as anti-domination is not a new thought. In
addition to its resonances in Brandeisian ideology, anti-domination is
the core principle of the post-War German Ordoliberal school which
held that “[t]he economic problems of the Weimar Republic and Nazi
Germany were attributable in part to the inability of the legal system
to control and, if necessary, to disperse private economic power.”72
Like many critics of the antitrust status quo today, the Ordoliberals
believed that “economic thought gradually had become isolated, and
economists had lost sight of both the political and social contexts of
economic issues.”73 The Ordoliberals argued that a liberal democratic
state required a competition policy that ensured individual liberty, as
defined by the absence of arbitrary control by other economic actors.74
Ordoliberalism exerted a profound influence on European Union
competition policy that continues to undergird conceptual differences

68. See Executive Order on Competition, supra note 3 (“Consolidation has increased the
power of corporate employers, making it harder for workers to bargain for higher wages and
better work conditions.”); see generally ERIC A. POSNER, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS
(2021) (documenting how consolidation has harmed workers and the lack of use of antitrust law
to fix it).
69. Remarks of Chair Lina M. Khan, supra note 47.
70. See Four Individuals Indicted on Wage Fixing and Labor Market Allocation Charges,
DOJ (Jan. 28, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-individuals-indicted-wage-fixing-andlabor-market-allocation-charges [https://perma.cc/7HNN-2AYN].
71. Executive Order on Competition, supra note 3 (emphasizing the benefits of more
aggressive antitrust enforcement for “small businesses and farmers” and racial minorities).
72. RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 22 (9th ed. 2018); see also
DANIEL A. CRANE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC SOURCES 252–54 (2013).
73. DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 237 (1998).
74. Crane, supra note 13, at 1330.
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between U.S. and EU law.75 With many antitrust reform advocates
believing that U.S. antitrust law should move in a European direction,
proposed legislation adopting explicitly European terminology,76 and
the FTC’s leadership committed to antitrust as anti-dominance, U.S.
antitrust law may move in this direction.
It is likely to encounter headwinds. On one hand, antitrust
principles may be applied uncontroversially to resist market power as
a form of economic domination. To the extent that workers, small
businesses, farmers, or other classes have become subject to excessive
market power because of lax antitrust enforcement—as the Biden
Executive Order on Competition claims—then reinvigoration of
antitrust enforcement will reduce domination, increase freedom, and
bolster democratic values. On the other hand, any effort to apply the
antitrust laws to resist “domination” apart from market power in an
economic sense would entail not just a shift toward a more aggressive
antitrust policy or a shift toward Europe but a wholesale reformulation of U.S. antitrust law and policy.
To illustrate this important distinction, consider a merger that will
adversely affect the interests of workers. Whether the merger entails
conventional antitrust concerns depends entirely on the mechanism by
which worker interests are harmed. If the merging firms obtain
monopsony power that allows them to suppress wages or other
conditions of employment, then the merger can be challenged on
traditional antitrust grounds.77 But if the merger involves layoffs that
do not reflect a reduction in competition or the exercise of market
power (for example, because the merging parties plan to close an old
and inefficient factory), then it cannot be policed by current antitrust
principles.78 Antitrust law is limited to resisting dominance and hence
bolstering democratic values when the dominance arises from an

75. James Keyte, Why the Atlantic Divide on Monopoly/Dominance Law and Enforcement
Is So Difficult to Bridge, 33 ANTITRUST 113, 114 (2018).
76. See, e.g., S933A, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) (prohibiting abuse of a dominant
position, in line with Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
77. See Concurring Statement of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Chair Lina M.
Khan Regarding FTC and State of Rhode Island v. Lifespan Corporation and Care New England
Health System, FTC (Jan. 17, 2022).
78. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness, and the World Arena: Efficiencies and
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 732 (1996) (arguing that it “would be
incongruous to suggest that layoffs should disqualify mergers under the antitrust law”); Joseph F.
Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 582–83
(1996) (examining the difference between layoffs caused by exercise of market power, which
would be actionable, and those not caused by the exercise of market power, which would not be).
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impairment of competition that also harms conventional economic
interests, such as efficiency and market performance.
Of course, that is a statement about what is, not what should be.
U.S. antitrust law could be reformulated to consider a set of concerns
other than the creation or exercise of market power. However, doing
so would come at a price. The Ordoliberals conceded that achieving
their conception of freedom necessarily entailed a loss of economic
efficiency.79 Further, application of antitrust principles to create
economic liberty unmoored from considerations of market power can
have paradoxical effects. For example, prohibitions on manufacturer
vertical restraints on downstream sellers, which were considered
important to preserving dealer freedom, induced manufacturers to
integrate forward into distribution, thus eliminating independent
dealers altogether.80 A policy meant to protect dealers may have
eliminated them. It was in light of such unintended consequences that
the Supreme Court observed that “an antitrust policy divorced from
market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks.”81
Antitrust law can play a constructive role in protecting individual
autonomy and personal freedom but within a framework that asks
measurable economic questions.
This is not to say that present antitrust standards have identified
the complete or correct set of relevant questions. There is surely much
work to be done to update the analytical tools necessary to identify the
causes of market power and antitrust responses in an age of
fundamental economic and technological change, particularly against
a backdrop of recent decades in which many feel antitrust has failed to
keep up. Such efforts should redound to the benefit of democratic antidomination norms. But that does not have to mean that antitrust law
needs to be expressed as an anti-domination tool in its doctrinal or
functional operations.
CONCLUSION
Democracy talk is cheap, so there is an impulse to dismiss it. As
applied to antitrust law, such dismissal would be unfortunate. There is
a legitimate public appetite to understand antitrust’s mission in
democratic terms, and there is much that the antitrust enterprise has
done and can do to bolster and preserve the democratic order.
79. CRANE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 72, at 253 (“If we want freedom, we have no option
but to sacrifice some advantage which we could obtain only by employing concentrated power.”).
80. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTC Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977).
81. Id. at 53, n.21.
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However, that does not mean that antitrust can or should become a
self-conscious instrument of democracy in its doctrines or operations.
An antitrust policy focused on mitigating market power and preserving
competition is more helpful to the democratic cause.

